LightSquared Attacks

Press release; Javad Ashjaee; May 23, 2011- My friend wrote to me that in a recent LightSquared test a JAVAD GNSS receiver was more susceptible to LightSquared jamming than other manufacturers' receivers.

Of course we are! Any receiver that can effectively defend against multipath and provide a high precision result will be more susceptible against one or another type of such jammers. Also, the receivers that show they are tracking satellites under jammer and are not affected by the interference, in reality the quality of their collected data may be significantly degraded such that their RTK solution will not converge to fixed, or worse, will provide erroneous results.

We have very wide bandwidth and wide AGC to receive every drop of information and get GPS signals with clear edges to mitigate multipath the number one source of error in high precision applications. Multipath is everywhere. As long as the Earth is below the antenna, or other objects near it, there is multipath!

That is why in the German Aerospace test, our multipath mitigation was substantially better than all others. Also, that is why our receiver is the only one which could mitigate the anomalies of SVN-49. See reports of both tests on

While we defend only against civilian jammers, such as harmonics of radio stations, which are very narrow band and innocently may exist in some locations, we report the existence of all types of jammers with our unique GNSS spectrum analyzer. See details in "Video Lessons".

GPS bands should be protected against any aggression so we can get the best of the GPS signals. We should not narrow our bandwidth and degrade performance of GPS to defend against systems like LightSquared. It is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect GPS, this national asset, and the many billions of dollars invested in it.